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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN JOHNSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

CaseNo.20110284-CA

PAYSON CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
jckieje

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of

Payson City Corporation? Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See U.R.C.P. Rule 56(c). A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed
for correctness and no deference is afforded to the district court's legal conclusions.
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 6, 177 P.3d 600. This issue was preserved when Johnson
opposed Payson City's motion for summary judgment by memorandum and at oral
argument (R:189, 209, 228).
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
Payson City ordinance 07-05-95 is set forth in the Addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

John Johnson appeals from the Order Granting Summary Judgment entered on February
22, 2011, which dismissed Johnson's claims against Payson City Corporation ("Payson City")
(R. 218-19).
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

John Johnson filed a Complaint against Payson City on August 11, 2008, alleging breach
of contract for Payson City failing to pay a Reimbursement Agreement (R. 3-9).
Payson City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on August 23, 2010 (R. 115-17).
Payson City asserted that the undisputed facts show Johnson was not entitled to any funds under
the Reimbursement Agreement because he did not pay for the infrastructure or its installation
subject to the Reimbursement Agreement (R. 162-63). Payson City asserted that Noel and Ray
Hiatt paid for the infrastructure and its installation (R. 163). Payson City further asserted that the
Reimbursement Agreement and Payson City ordinance required that before any reimbursement
could be paid, Payson City had to collect fees from other property owners to connect to the
2
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infrastructure (R. 163). Payson City asserted that it did not collect any fees for other property
owners to connect to the infrastructure, and therefore, Johnson was not entitled to reimbursement
(R. 163).
Johnson opposed the Motion, asserting that he hired Hiatt Construction to purchase and
install the infrastructure with the agreement that Hiatt would be paid once the lots were sold (R.
184-85). Before the lots were completed, the property was sold to Hiatt and another party (R.
184). As part of the sale, Johnson paid Hiatt for the costs of purchasing and installing the
infrastructure (R. 184). Johnson further asserted that Payson City's own records established that
it had collected the subject fees, and reimbursement was proper (R. 184). Thus, Johnson
maintained that disputed facts prevented summary judgment (R. 184).
The district court entertained oral arguments on the motion on January 5, 2011 (R. 209,
228). After oral arguments, the district court took the matter under advisement and entered a
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment on February 4, 2011, granting Payson City's motion
and dismissing Johnson's claim (R. 210-16). The Order Granting Summary Judgment was
entered on February 22, 2011 (R. 218-19). Johnson timely filed his notice of appeal on March
24,2011(R.222).
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
On or about June 13, 1995 Lana W. Johnson and John Johnson (husband and wife
at the time) purchased an undivided 50% interest in a parcel of real estate in Payson City
(the "Property"), with funds from their account (R:146, 165-66, 180). Title to their
interest in the Property was put in Lana Johnson's name only (R. 180). Lana Johnson's
in-laws, the Waldrons, also purchased a 50% undivided interest in the Property (R. 1651

These facts are taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Wayment v.
Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT 25, \ 3, 116 P.3d 271.
3
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66).
Thereafter, Johnson began working with Payson City Council to approve the
development and subdivision of the Property (R. 180). By June 19, 1996, the City
Council agreed to subdivide the Property, contingent upon Johnson upsizing the
pressurized irrigation and sewer lines to allow for additional property owners to connect
to the infrastructure (R. 179). City Council minutes show that Payson City agreed to
reimburse Johnson for the upsized lines (R. 175-76, 179). Johnson asked on numerous
occasions that the reimbursement agreement be put in writing, but that did not occur until
August 13, 1997, when Johnson signed the Reimbursement Agreement (R. 139-42, 179);
see also Addenda. The terms of the Reimbursement Agreement were that Johnson would
be eligible to receive up to $59,214.00 for installing the requisite upsized infrastructure
(R.141),
As the developer of the Property, Johnson hired Ray Hiatt of Hiatt Construction to
purchase and install the upsized irrigation and sewer lines ("infrastructure") (R. 134-35 ,
179). The initial terms of the agreement were that Ray Hiatt would be paid for the labor
and material costs as the individual lots on the Property were sold (R. 134-135, 145-46 ,
171-72,179).
Subsequently, Ray Hiatt and another person, Carrie Woods, desired to purchase
the Property (R. 179). Johnson and the other title owners decided to sell their interests in
the Property to Ray Hiatt and Carrie Woods (R. 179). The Property was sold to Ray
2

An unnumbered page exists between pages 134 and 135 of the record, which contains this
testimony.
3
The same problem exists with an unnumbered page between pages 145 and 146 of the record.
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Hiatt and Carrie Woods on August 4, 1997 (R. 165). As part of the sale, Ray Hiatt's
costs and expenses for purchasing and installing the infrastructure subject to the
Reimbursement Agreement were included in the amount of the final sale (R. 178-79).
Thereafter, Ray Hiatt claimed that he was entitled to the reimbursement value set
forth in the Reimbursement Agreement, and he applied for and received the full value of
the Reimbursement Agreement (R. 124-25, 164).
Johnson also applied for reimbursement under the Reimbursement Agreement but
was denied (R. 178).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issue before this Court is whether the district court's grant of summary
judgment, based on a finding that no material disputed facts exist, was in error.
John Johnson filed suit against Payson City to enforce a Reimbursement
Agreement which provided that if he installed upsized utility infrastructure in the subject
Property, the City would reimburse him his costs for said installation. Payson City filed
for summary judgment, asserting that another person, Ray Hiatt of Hiatt Construction,
paid for and installed the infrastructure, and therefore, Johnson was not entitled to any
reimbursement.
The district court ignored Johnson's testimony that he paid for the infrastructure
and its installation through the sale of the Property to Hiatt, and granted summary
judgment in favor of Payson City. In addition, the district court considered an issue not
raised in Payson City's motion: whether Johnson could satisfy the provisions of the
Reimbursement Agreement and Ordinance 07-05-95, which require the applicant seeking
5
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reimbursement to establish the exact amount he is entitled to. The district court found
that Johnson could not establish that he paid anything for the installation, and granted
Payson City's motion for summary judgment.
The facts, taken in a light most favorable to Johnson, show that Johnson paid for
the infrastructure and its installation through the sale of the Property. Accordingly,
material disputed facts prevent the issuance of summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

MATERIAL DISPUTED FACTS EXIST AS TO WHETHER JOHNSON
PAID FOR THE INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS INSTALLATION
To prevail on summary judgment, the "movant must show both that there is no

material issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, If 10, 177 P.3d 600 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c))
(original emphasis). "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Id. at \ 6, (internal quotations and citation omitted).
In this case, material disputed facts prevent the grant of summary judgment. The
district court held that because Johnson did not bear any out-of-pocket costs to install and
pay for the infrastructure, he could not satisfy the requirements of both the
Reimbursement Agreement and Payson City Ordinances, which require that Johnson
show the "actual cost" expended to install the infrastructure (R. 212-13). In making this
ruling, the district court found that there was "nothing in the record to substantiate" that
6
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when Johnson sold the Property, it took into consideration the value of the
Reimbursement Agreement, and that Johnson provided no testimony that demonstrates
that he and his wife sold the Property for an amount that had been reduced by the value of
the Reimbursement Agreement (R. 212). The district court further found that Johnson
was never a title holder to the Property and that the Reimbursement Agreement was
entered into after the date when Johnson and his wife sold the Property (R. 212).
In making these findings, the district court erroneously ignored the record
evidence, erroneously found that there were no material facts in dispute, and erroneously
granted Payson City's motion for summary judgment.
A.

Johnson paid for the infrastructure and its installment when the
Property was sold.

First of all, the district court's finding that Johnson did not bear any out-of-pocket
expenses for the infrastructure or its installation, and that this was an undisputed fact, is
erroneous. Both Johnson and Noel Hiatt (Ray Hiatt's son) testified that their initial
agreement was that Johnson hired Hiatt Construction to purchase the infrastructure and
install the infrastructure (R. 134-135, 145-46, 171-72, 179). While Johnson was not
going to pay Hiatt Construction for this work up-front, Hiatt Construction would be paid
once the lots were sold. Id. Instead of developing and selling each lot, Hiatt approached
Johnson and informed him that Carrie Woods wanted to purchase the Property (R. 170).
Once the Property was sold to Carrie Woods and Ray Hiatt, Hiatt's costs and expenses
for the installation of the infrastructure were included in the sale (R. 178-79). Thus,
taking the facts in a light most favorable to Johnson, the record shows that Johnson paid
7
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I

for the infrastructure and the costs for installing the infrastructure when the Property was
sold. Therefore, the district court erroneously found that Johnson "has not provided
testimony ... or any other evidence" that he paid for the infrastructure and its installation.
Accordingly, there are genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Johnson paid
for the infrastructure and its installation, and the Ruling should be reversed.
B.

The district court improperly raised and ruled on an issue not before
the court

Payson City argued in its Motion for Summary Judgment and its supporting
memorandum that it was entitled to summary judgment on the following grounds: (1)
Johnson failed to "demonstrate that he actually constructed an paid for the infrastructure
for which he seeks reimbursement; (2) the City did not collect any fees on the frontage on
the infrastructure so Johnson was not entitled to reimbursement; and (3) Johnson's
application for reimbursement was untimely (R. 116, 161-63)4.
The district court, however, considered an issue not raised in Payson City's motion
for summary judgment, and raised for the first time at oral argument and in its Ruling the
question of whether Johnson could establish the amount of actual costs and expenses he
paid for the infrastructure and its installation, and as such, whether Johnson could satisfy
the provisions of the Reimbursement Agreement and the Payson City ordinance that
purportedly require the applicant to establish the exact amount he is entitled to
reimbursement (R. 212-13; 228: 11). The district court ruled that Johnson could not
establish his actual out-of-pocket expenses for the infrastructure and its installation, and
4

The district court did not address the second and third issues in its Ruling, and these issues are
not before this Court.
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therefore, Johnson could not satisfy the requirements of the Reimbursement Agreement
and the Payson City ordinance (R. 212-13).
Because the issue of whether Johnson could establish the exact amount of his outof-pocket costs was not raised in Payson City's motion, it was not properly before the
district court. The district court raised this issue on its own, and Johnson was not aware it
was even at issue for summary judgment. Thus, the district court's finding that Johnson
"is incapable of establishing the actual costs incurred by him ... to install the
infrastructure" in order to satisfy certain requirements in the Reimbursement Agreement
and the Payson City ordinance was in error since it was not at issue (R. 212) (emphasis
added). For this reason alone, the Ruling should be reversed.
In any event, the Reimbursement Agreement included the estimate of what
Johnson's actual costs would be, and in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Payson City attached an exhibit to the Reimbursement Agreement
specifying where the costs would be incurred (R. 139, 141). Moreover, it cannot be
argued that the infrastructure and the cost of installing the infrastructure was zero, so the
district court erroneously ruled that Johnson was entitled to nothing. In addition, Hiatt
subsequently received the full $59,214 benefit, which is evidence of the costs Johnson
paid to Hiatt to install the infrastructure (R. 124-25, 164). Accordingly, the district court
erroneously found that Johnson could not establish that he incurred any costs in
purchasing and installing the infrastructure.
C

Johnson had at least an equitable interest in the Property.

The district court found that Johnson was never a title holder to the property in its
9
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Ruling holding that Johnson is unable to satisfy the requirements of the Reimbursement
Agreement (R. 212). Taking Johnson's declaration and his deposition testimony in a
light most favorable to him, the facts show that he was married to his wife when the
Property was purchased and both of them purchased the Property from their joint account
(R.146, 180). It just happened that his wife's name was put on the title (R.180). Thus,
Johnson had at least an equitable interest in the property, and every right to develop the
property.
In addition, the district court found that the Reimbursement Agreement was
entered into after the Property was sold to Carrie Woods and Ray Hiatt (R. 212). While
the Reimbursement Agreement was signed after the Property was sold, Johnson
submitted uncontested proof that Payson City council agreed as early as June 19, 1996, to
the conditions of the Reimbursement Agreement, and that it took Johnson a long period
of time just to have the document executed (R. 175-76, 179). Accordingly, the district
court's finding that the Reimbursement Agreement was entered into only after the
property was sold is erroneous.

10
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, John Johnson asks this Court to reverse the district
court's grant of Payson City's Motion for Summary Judgment, and to remand this matter
to the district court for further proceedings.
Dated this QJb day of July, 2011.

Aaron P. Dodd
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 25th day of July, 2011,1 served, via U.S. First Class
Mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon the following:
David C. Tuckett
439 West Utah Avenue
Payson, Utah 84651
Jody K. Burnett
George A. Hunt
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
PO Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JOHN JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Date: February 4, 2011

PAYSON CITY, a municipal corporation,

Case Number: 080402550
Judge David N. Mortensen

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the court pursuant to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment. The defendant asks the court to decide as a matter of law that the plaintiff cannot
satisfy the requirements of the Reimbursement Agreement and therefore does not have a viable
claim against defendant. Plaintiff John Johnson filed an Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment and Defendant Payson City filed a Reply. The court, after hearing oral arguments and
reviewing the motions and pleadings in the file, and finding good cause therefore, grants the
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material
Page 1 of 6
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fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, shall be considered in deciding a motion for summary judgment. Id. Additionally, "the
court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence
in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Conder v. A. L. Williams &
Assocs., Inc., 739 P;2d 634, 637 (Utah App. 1987).

III. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

On or around June 13, 1995 Lana W. Johnson (Plaintiffs wife at the time) purchased an
undivided 50% interest in a parcel of real estate in Payson City.

2.

On August 4, 1997 Lana Johnson sold her interest in the property to Carrie Woods.

3.

On that same date, August 4, 1997, Ray Hiatt purchased the other undivided 50% interest
in the parcel of land.

4.

Shortly thereafter, on or around August 13, 1997, Defendant Payson City and Plaintiff
John Johnson entered into a Reimbursement Agreement.

5.

In the Reimbursement Agreement Payson City agreed to reimburse John Johnson, as the
developer of the property, for some of the costs of installing utility infrastructure
including manholes, sewer, and pressurized irrigation because other property owners and
Payson City would benefit from the infrastructure.

Page 2 of 6
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6.

In pertinent part, the Reimbursement Agreement provides:
WHEREAS, the entire cost of that installation will be borne by
developer and at least a portion thereof will be reimbursable to
developer pursuant to the City Ordinances from amounts that the City
collects from adjacent property owners . . . .
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties mutually covenant and agree
as follows:
1.
That in consideration of the development and installation
of the infrastructure utilities as set forth above, the City hereby grants
to developer a Right of Reimbursement to be paid from such sums as
are actually collected by the City from other private property owners or
developers who have frontage on and connect to the infrastructure
utilities paid for by developer hereunder, the same to be paid by the
adjacent property owners as provided in Ordinance #19-70-5 of the
Payson City Ordinances.
(Emphasis added)

1.

Payson City Ordinance 07-05-95 amends City Ordinance 19-70-5 and prescribes, in
Paragraph C, the provisions for reimbursement:
the applicant's share of the actual cost of making such extension shall
be determined by the City Engineer.... the city will enter a deferred
credit on its books and records in the amount of the actual prorated
cost of the extension across the front of said benefitted property and
shall reimburse the applicant, his assignees or successors, upon
collection by the city of charges assessed against such benefitted
property as service connections are made.
(Emphasis added)

8.

Ray Hiatt and his son, Noel, developed the property and installed the infrastructure.

9.

The Hiatts posted the infrastructure bond, performed the pliysical labor and paid for the

Page 3 of 6
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necessary materials to install the infrastructure.
10.

The Hiatts donated the value of the Reimbursement Agreement to Payson City. The value
of the Reimbursement Agreement was determined according to Payson City Ordinance.

IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff John Johnson claims that he entered into an agreement with Ray Hiatt wherein
Hiatt agreed to provide the physical labor and bear the initial cost of the materials needed to
install the infrastructure and then Hiatt would receive payment when the lots were sold. John
Johnson claims that he ultimately incurred the costs of the infrastructure as contemplated in the
Reimbursement Agreement because those costs were accounted for when the property was sold.
In essence, John Johnson claims that Carrie Woods and / or Ray Hiatt purchased the property at
a discount because Join: Johnson intended to be reimbursed according to the terms of the
Reimbursement Agreement. Thus, plaintiff claims a diminution in purchase price entitles him to
reimbursement based upon an educated guess or estimates of the "actual cost" to install the
infrastructure.
The court finds Johnson's claims are untenable. Under the Reimbursement Agreement,
John Johnson needs to establish that "the entire cost of that installation [was] borne by [him]"
and that "the infrastructure utilities [were] paid for by [him]." Under the Payson City ordinances,
he needs to establish the "actual cost" expended to install the infrastructure. John Johnson is
unable to satisfy these requirements. Mr. Johnson cannot establish that the cost of the installation
Page 4 of 6
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was borne by him. He did not incur out-of-pocket costs to install the infrastructure. The court is
satisfied that Mr. Johnson is incapable of establishing the actual costs incurred by him (if he did
in fact bear any of the costs) to install the infrastructure. While he claims the property was sold
for a decreased amount in consideration of the value of the Reimbursement Agreement, there is
nothing in the record to substantiate this. Mr. Johnson has not provided testimony or a real-estate
contract or any other evidence that demonstrates that he and his wife sold the property for an
amount that had been reduced by the value of the Reimbursement Agreement. The record is
undisputed that plaintiff was never the title holder to the property.1 Finally, plaintiff
acknowledges that the property was sold prior to the Reimbursement Agreement being entered
into.
It is immaterial whether or not John Johnson retained the rights in the Reimbursement
Agreement when he and his wife sold the property because he is unable to satisfy the
requirements of the Agreement. Because John Johnson is unable to establish any actual cost
expended to install the infrastructure, the court grants Payson City's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff John Johnson is unable to satisfy the essential element of the Reimbursement

'Plaintiff did claim an equitable interest at argument, based upon his marriage to the title
holder.
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Agreement; he cannot demonstrate actual costs borne by him to install the utility infrastmcture.
Because the plaintiff cannot establish that he has any rights under the Reimbursement
Agreement, the court grants the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendant's counsel will prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it to the
court for signature.
Dated this 4th day of February 2011.

BY THE COURT:

Jk~i
Judge David N. Mortehsen ^ :^;'
Fourth Judicial District Court ^ ; ^
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BUMBERSEMENT A ^ p T r F H r N T
IHtS AGREEMENT entered into this ±1_ day of August
PAYSON CITY CORPORATION, hereinafter referred to as Thy." and

199j

by

^

fe

John_John,^

hereinafter referred to as "developer," residing at

284Q^North

700 East, Provo, UT 84604

WITNESSETH
THAT WHEREAS, developer is constructing and installing utility infrastructure which
manholes, s e v e r , p r e s s u r e i r r i g a t i o n " ,
"—"
——
, located at.
800 South & Turf Farm Rd, Payson & r ^ n ^ ^ 1880 ^ t

consists o f

Q

serve

(is/her property, and which utility infrastructure will go past the property of other private owners,
more fiilly described in Exhibit "A"; and
WHEREAS, the entire cost of that installation will be borne by developer and at least a
portion thereof will be reimbursable to developer pursuant to the City Ordinancesfromamounts
that the City collectsfromadjacent property owners under the ordinances applicable to
assessments in lieu of main line extensions.
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties mutually covenant and agree as follows:
1.

That in consideration of the development and installation of the infrastructure

utilities as set forth above, the City hereby grants to developer a Right of Reimbursement to be
paidfromsuch sums as are actually collected by the Cityfromother private property owners or
developers who havefrontageon and connect to the infrastructure utilities paid for by developer
hereunder, the same to be paid by the adjacent property owners as provided in Ordinance #19-705 of the Payson City Ordinances.
2.

Reimbursement shall be made upon application by developer at the time that the I f
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connection charges are made to the adjacent property owners, and shall be based upon the
proportion of the linealfrontageassessment made to the property owners uixder the applicable
ordinance.
3.

In no event shall reimbursement be in excess o f S 5 9 ' 2 1 4 . 0 0 y^ict ^ the

maximum amount paid by developer for which reimbursement might be made.
4.

This agreement is not a guarantee of collection by the City of that amoimt,

however, or of any other amount, and in no event shall the City be liable unless monies are
actually collectedfromthe adjacent property owners.
5.

This agreement shall be paid for a period often (10) yearsfromthe date of this

agreement, and thereafter shall terminate and the City shall have no further duty of
reimbursement.
WITNESS, the hands of the parties the day and yearfirstabove written.

U&OA y
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss

COUNTY OF UTAH )
On the Xh day af/Wui&r. 1997^ personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for
the State of Utah, /eft ft HJ)-:k ASCX.
, Developer, the signer of the above instrument,
who duly ackiowledged to me that he executed the same.

f^UX^Ciza
Notary Public

(J.'Of^*^
^

v

REBECCA A. JONES
* > r S = S ^ WARYWUC-STATEstUTAH
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Mayor
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UTAH )

:ss

On the X I . day of\^\\vW T 1997, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in aad for
the State of Utah, Russell L. EQIlman, Mayor of Payson City Corporation, the signer of the above
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Uh J > A A

A A 4 A A I

PAMELA B. KNIGHT
Notary Public
State of Utah
My Comm. Expires Jul 9.2001
«/& I Cow ui.* -J EM :*3Q« Ut 64661

^.H-N^M

Notary Public

^
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DEVELOPMENT

1. 1880' pressure irrigation X $7.80= $14,664.00
2. 1880' sewer X $10.50= $19,740.00
3. 6 sewer manholes X $1,440.00= $8,400.00
4. 800 South Pressure Irrigation $16,410.00
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ORDINANCE

fi>

0 5 ^ 5

AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 19-70-5, PAYSON C n V ORDINANCE
ENTITLED "EXTENSIONS IN NON-SUBDIVIDED AREAS."
BE AT ORDAINED BY THE PAYSON CITY COUNCIL, that section 19-70-5 be
amended to read as follows:
19-70-5
Extensions in Non-subdivided Areas
Cost of extending a water, sewer or power main to serve land that is not in a proposed
subdivision or large scale development and die cost of installing required off-site improvements
for such subdivisions and developments shall be borne by the applicant requesting such extension
in conformity with the following provisions:
A.

Maps and Plans to be Prepared - Cjty Council to Approve Extension Upon receipt of an
application for water, sewer or power service which requires a water, sewer or power
main extension, the Applicant shall prepare or cause to be prepared a map, approved by
the city engineer, that shows; (1) thefrontageto be benefited by such extension, and (2)
thefrontageowned by the applicant Hie Applicant shall then make; an estimate of the
cost of installing said proposed extension including that proportion of the cost to be borne
by the city, if any, and the cost which wiD be subject to reimbursement The City Engineer
shall approve the estimate. The design and construction of such extension shall be
approved by the City Council before such extension is installed,

B.

ApplfrgPt to Cwstlfrtt ImprpVgmgPtS AH costs in connection therewith, including
necessary pipes, pumps, tanks, manholes, poles, power lines and appurtenances, shall be
borne by the applicant, except that where the city requires the construction of a water,
sewer or power main that is larger than required to adequately serve the applicant, the city
wiB pay the difference in cost, The method and timing for payment of the city's share shall
be determined by special negotiations with the developer.

C.

Provisions for Reimbursement Upon completion of an extension, the applicant's share of
the actual cost of making such extension shall be determined by the City Engineer,
Whenever an extension of a water, sewer or power main benefits property which is
adjacent to the extension or extended from the end of an existing extension, other than
that which is owned by the applicant, the city will enter a deferred credit on its books and
records in the amount of the actual prorated cost of the extension across the front of said
benefited property and shall reimburse the applicant, his assignees or successors, upon
collection by the city of charges assessed against such benefited property as service
connections srt made. AH such reimbursement shall extend for a period often (10) yean
from the date of the completion of the extension and acceptance by the city.
A water, sewer or power main extension charge for each and every subsequent service
connection to an extension installed under die provisions of tins section shall be paid
before such service connection is made, except for frontage owned by the applicant or for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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which a water, sewer and/or power connection charge has already b eea paid. The water
sewer and power main extension charge is separate and is in addition to any other service
connection charge required by any other ordinance of the city,
The amount of an extension charge to benefited property shall be determined by
multiplying the number of linear feet offrontagein the lot or parcel for which service
connection is requested by one-half (Vi) the average cost per Hnear f o o t o f said extension.
AH necessary pumps, tanks, manholes, poles, power line and appurtenances that are
provided in making the extension shall be included in determining tb_e average cost per
linear foot.
All extension charges levied for purposes of reimbursement shall be determined using the
costs for installing water mains of six (6) inches in diameter, sewer mains of eight (8)
indies and power mains as determined by the City Engineer. Where the City requires that
the extension be made using larger lines, the difference between the cost of installing the
standard size line and the size required by the City shall not be subject to reimbursement
by the adjacent property owners.
This Ordinance shall take effect immediatefyxipon its passage by P a y ^ C ^ C o u n c a l and
publication, and the same shall be published in the Payson Chronicle, a newspaper published in
Payson City, and shall be recorded in the Ordinance book of Payson City, together with proof of
publication thereof
Passed by the Payson City Council thisJL day oiVjuiiL, 1995;

•• r r V r ' ' ^ "* JSC**?"«^
MAYOR

ATTEST

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

—

